Decisions under uncertainty — one method, every domain.
Every classical decision rule — EMV, expected utility, maximin, Hurwicz, minimax regret, Bayes, credibility, VaR/TVaR, Wang premiums, Gilboa–Schmeidler — is a special case of one auditable, parameterised engine.
The ADE in one page
The Actuarium Decision Engine (ADE) scores every action by combining a distorted, credibility-weighted expected utility with an ambiguity term and a regret penalty:
Parameter meanings
| Parameter | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Risk tolerance for exponential (CARA) utility; \rho\to\infty is risk-neutral. | |
| Wang / proportional-hazards distortion parameters (tail-loading). | |
| Ambiguity aversion weight — ε-contamination toward pure maximin. | |
| Regret-aversion weight — blend toward minimax regret. | |
| Credibility weight blending the Bayesian posterior with a reference distribution q(s). | |
| Prior belief and reference/benchmark distribution over states. | |
| Likelihood of observed evidence under each state, used for Bayesian updating. |
Classical method → ADE parameters
| Classical criterion | ADE setting | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Expected Monetary Value (EMV) | Plain probability-weighted average payoff. | |
| Expected Utility | vNM expected utility with CARA risk aversion. | |
| Maximin (Wald) | Only the worst state is judged. | |
| Maximax | Optimistic best-case evaluation. | |
| Hurwicz(α) | Optimism–pessimism blend, computed directly. | |
| Minimax regret (Savage) | Minimise the worst-case regret across states. | |
| Laplace | Principle of insufficient reason. | |
| Bayes (posterior EMV) | EMV under the Bayesian posterior. | |
| Bühlmann credibility | Linear-Bayes blend of posterior and reference. | |
| VaR / TVaR | Tail-weighted valuation via distortion. | |
| Wang premium principle | Actuarial premium-loading distortion. | |
| Gilboa–Schmeidler (maxmin EU) | Worst-case over a set of priors. | |
| Savage | Savage's own minimax-regret criterion. |
Full case study: Workers' Compensation pricing & reserving
Granite State Mutual — loss triangles, chain-ladder & Bornhuetter–Ferguson reserving, a rate indication build-up, a class plan review, and both decisions run through the ADE.
Decision Studio
Pick a realistic scenario, edit the states, actions, payoffs and beliefs, and watch every classical criterion and the ADE recommendation update live.
A $100,000 portfolio decision over a 1-year horizon under three macro states.
States of the world
Actions
Payoff matrix U[action][state]
| Action \ State | Recession | Muted growth | Boom |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equities | |||
| Bonds | |||
| Cash |
Prior beliefs p(s)
Normalised automatically to sum to 100%.
Evidence & Bayesian updating
Attitude parameters
Reference distribution q(s) used for credibility blending: Recession: 20%, Muted growth: 50%, Boom: 30%.
Recommendation
| Action | ADE score | EMV | Maximin | Maximax | Regret | CE | Risk premium |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bonds | 3,856.78 | 4,300 | 2,785.84 | 4,423.98 | 3,294.98 | 4,284.64 | 15.36 |
| Cash | 1,445.13 | 1,500 | 1,445.13 | 1,445.13 | 5,706.63 | 1,500 | -0 |
| Equities | -3,366.78 | 4,600 | -49,806.86 | 13,342.58 | 10,518.54 | -3,111.66 | 7,711.66 |
| Classical criterion | Equities | Bonds | Cash | Recommends |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Expected Monetary Value (EMV) | 4,600 | 4,300 | 1,500 | Equities |
| Expected Utility | -3,366.78 | 3,856.78 | 1,445.13 | Bonds |
| Maximin (Wald) | -25,000 | 3,000 | 1,500 | Bonds |
| Maximax | 22,000 | 5,000 | 1,500 | Equities |
| Hurwicz(α=0.5) | -1,500 | 4,000 | 1,500 | Bonds |
| Laplace (principle of insufficient reason) | 1,000 | 4,000 | 1,500 | Bonds |
| Bayes (posterior EMV) | 4,600 | 4,300 | 1,500 | Equities |
| Bühlmann credibility blend | 4,600 | 4,300 | 1,500 | Equities |
| Minimax regret (Savage) | -28,000 | -18,000 | -20,500 | Bonds |
| TVaR / Wang-distorted value | -6,748.31 | 3,763.13 | 1,500 | Bonds |
Sensitivity — where the recommendation flips
- rho: recommendation flips near 33.98, 339,801.176
- lambda: no flip across the sampled range — recommendation is robust to this parameter
- epsilon: no flip across the sampled range — recommendation is robust to this parameter
- omega: no flip across the sampled range — recommendation is robust to this parameter
- Z: no flip across the sampled range — recommendation is robust to this parameter
Why one method — and its limits
The Savage and von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms are what justify representing preferences by an expected (or distorted, ambiguity-robust) utility in the first place — they are normative, not descriptive: real people routinely violate them. The Ellsberg paradox shows people are ambiguity-averse in a way plain expected utility cannot represent; the Allais paradox shows the vNM independence axiom is regularly violated by the "certainty effect." ADE's $\varepsilon$ and distortion parameters are a controlled, disclosed departure from strict expected utility — not a claim that the axioms are false.
Every ADE run still depends on human judgement: elicitation of the prior $p(s)$, the payoff matrix, and the risk/ambiguity/regret parameters, and model risk — the engine is only as good as the states, actions and numbers fed into it. The sensitivity panel exists precisely because a technically correct method fed a fragile or overconfident input can still recommend the wrong action.
Go deeper
Foundations: probability as degree of belief
Kolmogorov's axioms vs. the Bayesian (subjective) interpretation, and de Finetti's coherence argument for why probability is the only rational way to grade uncertainty.
Expected utility and risk aversion
The von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, why expected value alone is not enough, ARA/RRA, certainty equivalents, and the common utility functions.
Bayesian updating and credibility
Bayes' theorem, conjugate families, Bühlmann credibility as linear Bayes, and how Z is simply a parameter of ADE.
Risk measures and probability distortion
VaR, TVaR, the Choquet integral, the Wang transform, spectral risk measures, and coherence.
Ambiguity and robustness
The Ellsberg and Allais paradoxes, maxmin expected utility, ε-contamination, multiplier preferences, and info-gap decision theory.
The value of information
EVPI, EVSI, preposterior analysis, and when it is worth paying to gather more data.
Decision trees and sequential decisions
Backward induction, folding back a decision tree, and the real-options intuition for staged commitments under uncertainty.
Behavioural pitfalls
Allais and framing effects, overconfidence, and calibration — where human judgement systematically departs from coherent decision-making.
Applications across domains
Worked ADE examples spanning insurance, finance, health, education, engineering, and personal decisions.