Actuarium

Decisions under uncertainty — one method, every domain.

Score(a)=(1ω)[(1ε)Dg,u,p(a)+εminsu(U[a][s])]ωRegret(a)\text{Score}(a) = (1-\omega)\Big[(1-\varepsilon)\,D_{g,u,p^*}(a) + \varepsilon\min_s u(U[a][s])\Big] - \omega\cdot\text{Regret}(a)

Every classical decision rule — EMV, expected utility, maximin, Hurwicz, minimax regret, Bayes, credibility, VaR/TVaR, Wang premiums, Gilboa–Schmeidler — is a special case of one auditable, parameterised engine.

The ADE in one page

The Actuarium Decision Engine (ADE) scores every action aa by combining a distorted, credibility-weighted expected utility with an ambiguity term and a regret penalty:

p(s)=Zp(se)+(1Z)q(s)p^*(s) = Z\cdot p(s\mid e) + (1-Z)\cdot q(s)u(x)=ρ(1ex/ρ)u(x) = \rho\left(1-e^{-x/\rho}\right)Score(a)=(1ω)[(1ε)Dg,u,p(a)+εminsu(U[a][s])]ωRegret(a)\text{Score}(a) = (1-\omega)\Big[(1-\varepsilon)\,D_{g,u,p^*}(a) + \varepsilon\min_s u(U[a][s])\Big] - \omega\cdot\text{Regret}(a)

Parameter meanings

ParameterMeaning
ρ\rhoRisk tolerance for exponential (CARA) utility; \rho\to\infty is risk-neutral.
λ,κ\lambda,\kappaWang / proportional-hazards distortion parameters (tail-loading).
ε\varepsilonAmbiguity aversion weight — ε-contamination toward pure maximin.
ω\omegaRegret-aversion weight — blend toward minimax regret.
ZZCredibility weight blending the Bayesian posterior with a reference distribution q(s).
p(s),q(s)p(s), q(s)Prior belief and reference/benchmark distribution over states.
L(es)L(e\mid s)Likelihood of observed evidence under each state, used for Bayesian updating.

Classical method → ADE parameters

Classical criterionADE settingNote
Expected Monetary Value (EMV)ρ, λ=0, ε=0, ω=0, Z=1\rho\to\infty,\ \lambda=0,\ \varepsilon=0,\ \omega=0,\ Z=1Plain probability-weighted average payoff.
Expected Utilityfinite ρ, λ=0, ε=0, ω=0\text{finite } \rho,\ \lambda=0,\ \varepsilon=0,\ \omega=0vNM expected utility with CARA risk aversion.
Maximin (Wald)ε=1\varepsilon=1Only the worst state is judged.
Maximaxρ, point mass on argmaxsU[a][s]\rho\to\infty,\ \text{point mass on }\arg\max_s U[a][s]Optimistic best-case evaluation.
Hurwicz(α)αmax+(1α)min\alpha\max+(1-\alpha)\minOptimism–pessimism blend, computed directly.
Minimax regret (Savage)ω=1\omega=1Minimise the worst-case regret across states.
Laplacep(s)=1/n, ρ, λ=0, ε=0, ω=0p(s)=1/n,\ \rho\to\infty,\ \lambda=0,\ \varepsilon=0,\ \omega=0Principle of insufficient reason.
Bayes (posterior EMV)ρ, Z=1, posterior p(se)\rho\to\infty,\ Z=1,\ \text{posterior }p(s\mid e)EMV under the Bayesian posterior.
Bühlmann credibilityZ(0,1)Z\in(0,1)Linear-Bayes blend of posterior and reference.
VaR / TVaRWang λ, ρ, ε=0, ω=0\text{Wang }\lambda,\ \rho\to\infty,\ \varepsilon=0,\ \omega=0Tail-weighted valuation via distortion.
Wang premium principleg=Φ(Φ1(t)+λ)g=\Phi(\Phi^{-1}(t)+\lambda)Actuarial premium-loading distortion.
Gilboa–Schmeidler (maxmin EU)ε=1 (ε-contamination)\varepsilon=1\text{ (}\varepsilon\text{-contamination)}Worst-case over a set of priors.
Savageω=1\omega=1Savage's own minimax-regret criterion.

Full case study: Workers' Compensation pricing & reserving

Granite State Mutual — loss triangles, chain-ladder & Bornhuetter–Ferguson reserving, a rate indication build-up, a class plan review, and both decisions run through the ADE.

Decision Studio

Pick a realistic scenario, edit the states, actions, payoffs and beliefs, and watch every classical criterion and the ADE recommendation update live.

The reserving actuary must book a point reserve. Understating risks a strengthening charge next year; overstating trapped capital. States are the eventual ultimate loss development outcome.

States of the world

Actions

Payoff matrix U[action][state]

Action \ StateFavorable developmentAs expectedAdverse development
Book low (best estimate −10%)
Book central
Book high (+10%, prudent)

Prior beliefs p(s)

Favorable development25.0%
As expected50.0%
Adverse development25.0%

Normalised automatically to sum to 100%.

Evidence & Bayesian updating

OffOn

Attitude parameters

Risk-neutral

Reference distribution q(s) used for credibility blending: Favorable development: 25%, As expected: 50%, Adverse development: 25%.

Recommendation

Book central
EVPI = 22,500
ActionADE scoreEMVMaximinMaximaxRegretCERisk premium
Book central-18,765.26-15,000-94,281.9419,220.9124,889.14-18,094.363,094.36
Book high (+10%, prudent)-23,693.22-22,500-31,874.21-10,202.6929,817.11-22,636.73136.73
Book low (best estimate −10%)-50,463.98-35,000-205,529.745,317.3156,587.87-45,966.7410,966.74
Classical criterionBook low (best estimate −10%)Book centralBook high (+10%, prudent)Recommends
Expected Monetary Value (EMV)-35,000-15,000-22,500Book central
Expected Utility-50,463.98-18,765.26-23,693.22Book central
Maximin (Wald)-150,000-80,000-30,000Book high (+10%, prudent)
Maximax50,00020,000-10,000Book low (best estimate −10%)
Hurwicz(α=0.5)-50,000-30,000-20,000Book high (+10%, prudent)
Laplace (principle of insufficient reason)-40,000-20,000-20,000Book central
Bayes (posterior EMV)-35,000-15,000-22,500Book central
Bühlmann credibility blend-35,000-15,000-22,500Book central
Minimax regret (Savage)-130,000-60,000-60,000Book central
TVaR / Wang-distorted value-83,511.77-40,864.61-26,962.2Book high (+10%, prudent)

Sensitivity — where the recommendation flips

  • rho: recommendation flips near 157.722, 157,721.735
  • lambda: no flip across the sampled range — recommendation is robust to this parameter
  • epsilon: recommendation flips near 0.063
  • omega: recommendation flips near 0.229
  • Z: recommendation flips near 0.438

Why one method — and its limits

The Savage and von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms are what justify representing preferences by an expected (or distorted, ambiguity-robust) utility in the first place — they are normative, not descriptive: real people routinely violate them. The Ellsberg paradox shows people are ambiguity-averse in a way plain expected utility cannot represent; the Allais paradox shows the vNM independence axiom is regularly violated by the "certainty effect." ADE's $\varepsilon$ and distortion parameters are a controlled, disclosed departure from strict expected utility — not a claim that the axioms are false.

Every ADE run still depends on human judgement: elicitation of the prior $p(s)$, the payoff matrix, and the risk/ambiguity/regret parameters, and model risk — the engine is only as good as the states, actions and numbers fed into it. The sensitivity panel exists precisely because a technically correct method fed a fragile or overconfident input can still recommend the wrong action.

Go deeper

Ask the tutor